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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORALEE GREENHALGH, individually 
and as Guardian Ad Litem for the minor 
PATRICK GREENHALGH and 
WILLIAM T. GREENHALGH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DOCTOR ROBERT HOGAN and 
PAYSON CITY HOSPITAL through 
its Board of Directors and PAYSON 
CITY as the sole owner and proprietor 
of PAYSON CITY HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DOCTOR ROBERT HOGAN 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a malpractice action against defendant doctor 
and defendant hospital for alleged negligent care of plain-
tiffs Coralee Greenhalgh and her infant son, Patrick 
Greenhalgh, during their confinement in defendant hos-
pital for childbirth and post-natal care, for damages 
allegedly sustained by all of the plaintiffs as a result of 
the alleged negligence upon the part of the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The motion of defendant Robert Hogan to dismiss 
all of the claims except the claim of the minor plaintiff, 
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of plaintiffs to bring the action within the limitations 
requirements of Section 78-12-28 (3), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended by Chapter 212, Section 1, L. U. 1971. (R. 65.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Hogan seeks an affirmance of the judg-
ment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the filing of a com-
plaint in the District Court of Utah County on December 
18, 1973. (R.3.) It is alleged in the complaint that the 
plaintiff Coralee Greenhalgh entered the Payson City 
Hospital on or about the 14th day of January, 1970, for 
the purpose of giving birth to her child and receiving 
pre-natal and post-natal care at said hospital (R. 4.); that 
on or about the last of October, 1969, the plaintiff Cora-
lee Greenhalgh, who was pregnant, employed the defend-
ant Dr. Robert Hogan to provide pre-natal care, to deliver 
her newborn child, and to provide post-natal care for 
mother and child, and that Dr. Robert Hogan for a period 
of approximately two months prior to the plaintiff's 
entering the hospital provided pre-natal care to her (R. 4.); 
that plaintiff Coralee Greenhalgh gave birth to her infant 
son, plaintiff Patrick Greenhalgh, on January 14, 1970 
(R. 4, 8, 11, 15.); and that defendant doctor was negligent 
in failing to discover in pre-natal care that the Rh negative 
blood of the plaintiff Coralee Greenhalgh was sensitive to 
producing anti-bodies to the blood of the infant plaintiff 
Patrick Greenhalgh, and that by reason of failure to dis-
cover this incompatability, both plaintiffs sustained serious 
2 
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peronal injuries (R. 6, 11, 13-15.); that this error was 
discovered on or about January 18, 1970, four days after 
the date of birth, and that the infant plaintiff was trans-
ferred to Utah County [sic} Hospital for further treat-
ment on that date. 
It is further alleged that as a direct and proximate 
result of the negligence of defendant Dr. Robert Hogan, 
the plaintiff William T. Greenhalgh, the infant's father, 
has incurred expenses in the payment of additional hos-
pitalization, medication, therapy, and psychiatric and 
psychological counselling for the plaintiffs Coralee Green-
halgh and Patrick Greenhalgh, and that plaintiff William 
T. Greenhalgh has suffered permanent changes in his 
marital and family life to his general damage in the 
amount of $150,000.00. (R. 18-19.) 
It is clear that the causes of action, if any, accrued on 
or about the 18th day of January, 1970, when the alleged 
error in testing the blood of the mother and child was dis-
covered. (R. 64.) The appropriate two year statute of 
limitations became effective on May 11, 1971, 78-12-28,, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended by Chapter 212, Section 1, L. U* 
1971. This action, therefore, could have been brought a t 
any time up to May 11, 1973. (R. 64.) The action was 
not commenced until December 18, 1973. (R. 3.) 
For this failure to comply with the statute of limita-
tions applicable to malpractice actions, and also by reason 
of the fact that there is no right of action for loss of con-
sortium on behalf of plaintiff, William T. Greenhalgh, 
this defendant moved to dismiss all of the claims except 
3 
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the claim of the minor plaintiff, Patrick Greenhalgh. (R. 
39.) This motion was supported by a memorandum of 
authorities, (R. 41-43.) and by a supplemental memoran-
dum of authorities. (R. 45-49.) 
This motion was argued before Judge Sorensen and 
was taken under advisement. (R. 58.) Subsequently, this 
defendant's motion was granted. (R. 64, 65.) This appeal 
followed. (R. 74-75.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS CORALEE 
GREENHALGH AND WILLIAM T. GREEN-
HALGH ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
It is the position of defendant Hogan that the claims 
of Coralee Greenhalgh and William T. Greenhalgh are 
barred by the two year statute of limitations, Section 78-
12-28 (3) U.C.A., 1953, as amended by Chapter 212, Sec-
tion 1, L. U. 1971. The effective date of this statute was 
May 11, 1971. The cause of action upon which the com-
plaint is based accrued by January 18, 1970 (R. 64.), how-
ever the complaint was not filed until December 18, 1973, 
approximately two and a half years after the effective date 
of the statute. 
Section 78-12-47, U.C.A. 1953, as amended by Chap-
ter 212, Section 2, L. U. 1971, provides as follows: 
"This act shall not be construed to be retroactive." 
It is defendant's position that although the statute is not 
to be retroactive, it nevertheless applies to a cause of action 
4 
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that accrued prior to its effective date and bars such an 
action if it is not commenced within two years after the 
effective date of the statute which means that the action in 
this case had to be commenced no later than May 11, 
1973. (R. 64.) 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Day and Night Heat-
ing Co. v. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, 432 P.2d 43 (1967), laid 
this matter to rest. In that case a materialman filed suit 
against the owner to recover for materials furnished on 
the ground that the owner had failed to obtain a bond to 
protect materialmen. The plaintiff's cause of action arose 
on December 1, 1964, and at that time there was a three 
year statute of limitations in effect. Early in 1965 the 
Legislature shortened the statute of limitations for such 
causes of action from three years to one year. The effec-
tive date of the Act was May 15, 1965. Plaintiff filed his 
action on September 9, 1966, four months after the statu-
tory deadline. The plaintiff argued that the 1965 legisla-
tion shortening the statute of limitations operated retro-
actively and destroyed a right that the plaintiff had. The 
court rejected this argument and in so doing, said: 
"Plaintiff says (1) it should be entitled to rely on 
the three-year statute, and (2) that the 1965 legis-
lation operated retroactively on the former, and 
destroyed some right plaintiff had. Not so. 
"The question of retroactivity is not involved in 
this case at all. The retroactivity argument has to 
do with legislation that at the time of enactment 
chops off forever a right subsisting under a previ-
ous statute at the chop-off time. In the instant case 
the right asserted was not chopped off at all, but 
the time to assert it may have been shortened. 
5 
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Certainly a person who is given seventeen and one-
half months to assert it is not precluded from pur-
suing it." 432 P.2d at 44 (Emphasis added). 
The circumstances in the present case are similar to 
the situation as it existed in Ruff. In the present case the 
new statute of limitations did not "chop off forever a 
right subsisting under a previous statute at the chop-off 
time." Instead, all the new statute of limitations did was 
to shorten the time in which to assert a pre-existing right. 
Thus, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Ruff, "the 
question of retroactivity is not involved in this case at all." 
Appellant in his brief seeks to distinguish the Ruff case on 
the grounds that the limitations in that case went to the 
"cause of action or right to sue whereas in the present case 
the limitation, like most statutes, goes to the remedy of 
the defendant." (Brief of appellants at 14). This distinc-
tion, however, is without merit. The Utah Supreme Court 
in Ruff did not seek to limit its holding, but rather it 
stated its preference for the rule laid down in Earle v. 
Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 
264 (1939), where that court stated: 
"The limitation prescribed by the new statute com-
menced when the cause of action was first sub-
jected to the operation of the statute, that is, upon 
its effective date." 432 P.2d at 45. 
It is clear that there is no issue of "retroactive" opera-
tion of the statute under the definition given the word 
"retroactive" by the Utah Supreme Court. In Silver King 
Mines v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 
689, the Utah Supreme Court held that a worker's widow 
could collect under Workmen's Compensation even 
6 
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though the amendment allowing her to recover was passed 
before the death of the workman and before her rights to 
death benefits came into existence. The Utah court held 
that this did not amount to giving the amendment a retro-
active effect and went on to say: 
"A statute is not made retroactive merely because 
it draws on antecedent facts for its operation/' 
While the cause of action in this case accrued prior to the 
enactment of the two year statute of limitations, the cause 
of action was not cut off on the effective date of the statute. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Ruff, no cause of 
action was chopped off; rather, the time within which 
plaintiff had to assert its claim was simply shortened. This 
cannot be viewed as a retroactive operation of the law. 
Another case close in point is O'Donoghue v. Wash-
ington, 66 Wash. 2d 787, 405 P.2d 258 (1965), in which 
the Washington Supreme Court held that where the 
plaintiff was injured in a state hospital on May 15, 1963, 
the fact that a statute limiting the time for the filing of a 
suit for damages arising out of tortious conduct to 120 
days became effective on June 13, 1963, did not prejudice 
the substantive rights of the plaintiff and that the action 
filed on December 10, 1963, was barred. It is important to 
note that at the time the O'Donoghue case was decided the 
Washington courts had a well established judicial rule 
that "limitation laws pertain only to the remedy, and may 
be changed at the pleasure of the legislature, but such laws 
will not be given retroactive effect." In holding that the 
plaintiff's cause of action was barred, the O'Donoghue 
1 
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court cited with approval the rule laid down in Hanford 
v. King County, 111 Wash. 659, 661, 192 P. 1013, 1014 
(1920): 
"The statute not being retroactive, to what extent 
does it apply to causes of action which had accrued 
at the time it became operative? Upon this ques-
tion . . . the rule of the United States Supreme 
Court (Sohn v. Watterson, 117 Wall. 596, 21 
L.Ed. 737) was adopted, which is to the effect that 
a new statute of limitations takes effect upon the 
pre-existing rights of actions and limits them, but 
in every such case the full time allowed by the 
statute is available to the complainant; in other 
words, the limitation of the new statute as applied 
to pre-existing causes of action commences when 
the cause of action is first subjected to the opera-
tion of the statute, unless the legislature has other-
wise provided/9 (Emphasis added) 
Clearly, the better reasoned rule holds that statutes 
of limitations affect remedies only and are matters of pro-
cedure and not of substantive rights and that the limita-
tion prescribed by the statute in force when the action 
was commenced controls in each case. Sheffel v. Cities 
Service Oil Co., 203 Okla. 235, 222 P.2d 1024 (1950). 
Another case which contains language supporting this 
position is McNichols v. Walton, 120 Colo. 269, 208 P.2d 
1156 (1949), where the Colorado court stated: 
"An amendment of a statute by a subsequent act 
operates precisely as if the subject matter of the 
amendment had been incorporated in the prior act 
at the time of its adoption so far as regards any 
action had after the amendment is made. We think 
that an act is not retroactive if it applies to persons 
who presently possess a continuing status even 
8 
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though a part or all of their requirements to consti-
tute it were fulfilled prior to the passage of the 
act or amendments thereto." (Emphasis added) 
When the Utah Legislature provided that the Act 
would not be retroactive, it was simply expressing its in-
tent that no claims with respect to which the two years 
stated in the statute had already run would be immedi-
ately barred. The rule as stated in Day and Night Heating 
Co. v. Ruff, supra, is that beginning on May 11, 1971, 
the effective date of the statute, all plaintiffs having 
claims based on medical malpractice had two years from 
that date within which to commence the action. This is a 
prospective rather than a retrospective application of the 
statute of limitations and is clearly the rule applied under 
Utah law. Statements to the effect that a law is not retro-
active merely because part of the factual situation to 
which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment can also 
be found in Frisbee v. Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 169, 
457 P.2d 408, 411 (1969), and in Hill v. City of Billings, 
328 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Mont. 1958). 
The claims of Mr. and Mrs. Greenhalgh having 
accrued in January, 1970, the two year statute of limita-
tions having become effective May 11, 1971, and the com-
plaint in this case not having been filed until December 
18, 1973, it is apparent under the foregoing authorities 
that their claims are barred and that the order to dismiss 
should be affirmed. 
9 
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POINT II 
THERE IS N O RIGHT OF ACTION FOR 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM ON BEHALF OF 
PLAINTIFF, WILLIAM T. GREENHALGH. 
The third cause of action alleged in the complaint 
seeks recovery by Mr. Greenhalgh as the husband of Cora-
lee Greenhalgh for medical expenses and for loss of con-
sortium resulting from the injuries sustained by her. (R. 
20.) Section 30-2-4, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
' There shall be no right of recovery by the hus-
band on account of personal injury or wrong to his 
wife, or for expenses connected therewith." 
Under this provision of Utah law, the common law right 
of a husband to bring an action for loss of consortium is 
abolished. This result is implied in the case of Ellis v, 
Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 492 P.2d 985 (1972), in which 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a wife had no recovery 
under Utah law for loss of consortium due to injuries sus-
tained by her husband. In so holding, the court stated: 
"The wife has no basis for her cause of action. 
At common law she could not sue for loss of con-
sortium, and under the married women's act no 
cause of action was given to her for negligent in-
jury to her husband. Our statute (30-2-4) placed 
husband and ivife on an equal basis by saying: 
\ . . There shall be no right of recovery by the 
husband on account of personal injury or wrong 
to his wife. . . .' " 493 P.2d at 986. 
The belief that there is no recovery by the husband 
for loss of consortium due to injuries sustained by his 
wife has been reiterated in the language of many cases 
10 
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involving Utah law. The Supreme Court in Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman, U Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, in referring to 
Section 30-2-4, U.C.A. 1953, said: 
"This language simply takes from the husband the 
right of action for injury to the wife and gives it 
to her." 
Justice Henriod in the concurring opinion in Taylor v. 
Patton, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696, stated: 
"It seems obvious to the writer, that instead of 
creating tort rights in the wife, Section 30-2-4 is 
designed only to give to the wife and take from the 
husband the common law right to wages and to 
damages for torts committed by third persons upon 
her." 
In Black v. U.S.A., 263 F.Supp. 470, Judge Christen-
sen came to the conclusion that under Utah law there was 
no right of action for loss of consortium. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in W. 
W. Clyde & Co. v. Dyess, 126 F.2d 719. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated that Section 30-2-4 — 
". . . strips the husband of any right of recovery 
for personal injuries sustained by the wife arising 
out of the tort of a third person, and it vests in her 
the right to recover for such a wrong as though 
she were an unmarried woman. . ." 
The law in Utah, holding that the husband has no 
recovery for loss of consortium, is clearly in accord with 
the holdings of many courts in other jurisdictions. For 
other cases reaching the same result, see: Lockwood v. 
Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330; Kronen-
bitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.S. 2d 524, 121 N.E.2d 
11 
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898; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N . C 821, 32 
S.E.2d 611; Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236 
N.W.222; Taylor v. S. H. Kress & Co., 12 P.2d 808 (Kan.); 
Gearing v. Behrson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785; Martin 
v. United Electric Railways Co., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 497; 
Floyd v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114; Jacobson v. 
Fullerton, 181 la. 1195, 165 N.W. 358; Alsop v. Eastern 
Air Lines, 171 F.Supp. 180 (E.D. Va.); and Bea v. Russo, 
21 So.2d 530 (La. App.). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Coralee Greenhalgh and William T. 
Greenhalgh have failed to commence their action within 
the appropriate statute of limitations and the trial court 
correctly dismissed all of the claims except the claim of 
the minor plaintiff, Patrick Greenhalgh, and the judgment 
below should be affirmed. In the alternative, the third 
cause of action should be dismissed in its entirety because 
it fails to state a claim against the defendant Hogan upon 
which relief can be granted inasmuch as there is no right 
of action for loss of consortium under Utah law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
GLENN C. HANNI 
Attorney for Respondent 
Doctor Robert Hogan 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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